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TOWARD A NEW SEPARATION OF CHURCH 
AND STATE: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
ANALOGIES TO THE SUPREME COURT 
DECISION IN HOBBY LOBBY BY THE 
DECISION IN OBERGEFELL v. HODGES 
VINCENT J. SAMAR* 
Abstract: In June 2015, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court of the 
United States determined that there is a fundamental right to marriage that ex-
tends to same-sex couples. This Article analyzes the Obergefell decision in 
light of the Court’s 2014 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby regarding reli-
gious protections that might by analogy be afforded under state Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts. In particular, the article considers whether a gov-
ernment official may claim the right to religious freedom to deny issuing mar-
riage licenses to same-sex couples. Additionally, the article suggests that a 
new standard for the separation of church and state may be required. Although 
the 2015 decision prevents the government from denying marriage to same-
sex couples, the decision does not directly affect private businesses that 
choose not to provide services for same-sex weddings. It may, however, 
have an important indirect effect if laws are already present that prohibit 
sexual ori-entation discrimination. Therefore, the article explores possible 
avenues for protection from private discrimination and considers the 
questions that remain in the wake of the Obergefell decision.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This article will offer a reading of the 2014 United States Supreme 
Court decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores1 that is both consistent 
with the Court’s landmark 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges 2  and 
which also affords some direction to state courts interpreting their state Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs) in light of the these two recent 
Supreme Court decisions. Because the factual situations that attend future 
RFRA cases before the state and federal courts will likely involve two fun-
damental constitutional rights—the free exercise of religion and the right to 
marry—as well as the state’s compelling interest in favor of equality, de-
termining how to understand what these two cases represent should afford 
needed clarity to this area of law. 
Part I will review the arguments in the Justices’ opinions in the Hobby 
Lobby case as they might have been understood prior to the 2015 Court de-
cision in Obergefell v. Hodges. Part II will attempt to draw out the various 
concerns that future cases are likely to raise both for the LGBT community 
and those concerned about protecting the free exercise of religion. Part III 
will closely examine the Court’s holding in Obergefell v. Hodges, the argu-
ments it relied upon to justify marriage equality, and the concerns raised by 
the dissent. Part IV will then make use of what Obergefell provides to both 
clarify ambiguities that may have been left open in Hobby Lobby as well as 
to provide a basis for future court interpretations of state RFRA statutes and 
the separation of church and state. Hobby Lobby can be distinguished from 
Obergefell v. Hodges because the former involves a statutory interpretation 
of a federal statute while the latter is a federal constitutional case. This dif-
ference will have a substantial bearing as to what rights are considered priv-
ileged going forward. A brief conclusion setting forth the views of this arti-
cle will occur at the end. 
I. HOBBY LOBBY AND WHAT THAT CASE SIGNIFIES 
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the Court heard a consolidated set of two 
cases challenging a United States Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices (HHS) regulation under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA).3 The regulation required all non-exempt organizations “to pro-
vide [heath insurance] ‘coverage, without cost sharing’ for ‘[a]ll Food and 
Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization proce-
                                                                                                                           
 1 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 2 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 3 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (cod-
ified as amended at scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 
2759, 2766–67. 
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dures, and patient education and counseling,’” including contraceptives that 
would block “an already fertilized egg from developing any further by in-
hibiting its attachment to the uterus.”4 
The petitioners, three closely held corporations, claimed that they had 
a religious view “that life begins at conception” and that following the HHS 
regulation would force them to violate their religious beliefs.5 The corpora-
tions claimed an exemption from the regulation on the ground that it would 
constitute a “substantial burden” on their freedom of religion in violation of 
the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).6 
By a five to four majority, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioners.7 
The majority opinion written by Justice Alito and joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas, adopted the petitioners’ 
view that closely held corporations could hold religious beliefs by adopting 
the beliefs of their shareholders because they were not publically traded.8 It 
then went on to agree with the petitioners that the present regulation would 
substantially burden their exercise of religion because, unlike previously 
disallowed secular challenges to general tax revenue, the claimed issue at 
stake concerned “the specific contraceptive methods [petitioners would 
have to fund even though it] violates their religious beliefs.”9 
The majority opinion next considered whether RFRA itself might pro-
vide an exception covering the HHS regulation. The Court noted that RFRA 
prohibits the “[g]overnment [from] substantially burden[ing] a person’s ex-
ercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applica-
bility” unless the government “demonstrates that application of the burden 
to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling govern-
mental interest.”10 The majority accepted the government’s contention that 
providing health care for women was a compelling state interest under the 
ACA.11 Instead, it focused on the second prong of the RFRA test, namely, 
whether the government chose the least restrictive means to satisfy its com-
pelling interest.12 
The majority stated that “[t]he most straightforward way of doing this 
would be for the Government to assume the cost of providing the four con-
                                                                                                                           
 4 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762–63. 
 5 Id. at 2766. 
 6 Id.; Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb to -4 (1993). 
 7 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2758. 
 8 Id. at 2774–75. 
 9 Id. at 2779 (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (plurality) and Board of Ed. of 
Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248–49 (1968). 
 10 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2767 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)). 
 11 Id. at 2780. 
 12 Id. 
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traceptives at issue to any women who are unable to obtain them under their 
health-insurance policies due to their employers’ religious objections.” 13 
That, in fact, is what the government had done with respect to non-profit 
organizations, and the majority continued by stating that “both RFRA and 
its sister statute, [Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
(“RLUIPA”)], may in some circumstances require the Government to ex-
pend additional funds to accommodate citizens’ religious beliefs.”14 
Justice Kennedy provided the necessary fifth vote for the majority and 
wrote a separate concurring opinion that may have been meant to signal a 
narrower understanding of the Court’s opinion than might have been held 
by the remaining members of the majority.15 Two particular passages from 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion are worth noting in this regard. First, 
Kennedy states that “[t]here are many medical conditions for which preg-
nancy is contraindicated.”16 Given that the majority essentially passed over 
the compelling interest question and just accepted the government’s posi-
tion regarding it, is Kennedy’s language likely meant to support a stronger 
claim for women’s contraceptive health more generally? 
More pertinent to where the majority focused attention, namely on the 
second prong of the RFRA test concerning whether the government’s com-
pelling interest was narrowly tailored, Kennedy emphasized that HHS had 
established for nonprofits “an existing, recognized, workable, and already-
implemented framework to provide coverage.” 17  This statement is im-
portant if it is meant to respond to the dissent’s claim that the majority’s 
broad language is not limited to cases where contraceptives might be alter-
natively provided. Justice Alito had asserted in the majority, “The Govern-
ment has a compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to partici-
pate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial dis-
crimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal.”18 Obviously, 
however, not every form of possible RFRA conflict will concern race, let 
alone contraceptive provisions, and some may be more inclined to give rise 
to religious objections than others; for example, where a florist, by virtue of 
her religious beliefs, refuses to cater a same-sex wedding.19 Kennedy, there-
                                                                                                                           
 13 Id. 
 14  Id. at 2781 (citing Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2000)). 
 15 Id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 16 Id. at 2786. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 2783. 
 19 See Ingersoll v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., No. 13-2-00871-5, 2015 WL 720213 (Wash. Super. Ct. 
Feb. 18, 2015) at *7–8; see also Lambda Legal, Odgaard v. Civil Rights Commission, http://www.
lambdalegal.org/in-court/cases/odgaard-v-iowa-civil-rights-commission [http://perma.cc/2AUA-HZKH] 
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fore, may be implying that only where the government has already set a 
narrower alternative in place is there reason to believe that any broader re-
striction is not the least restrictive.20 If so, then antidiscrimination laws, for 
which the government can show a compelling interest, should be immune 
from a possible RFRA attack, because such statutes are unlikely to be ac-
commodated by any less restrictive alternative. 
Among the various disagreements by the dissenters, Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, particularly emphasized the scope of the 
majority opinion’s language. As Justice Ginsburg put it: “In a decision of 
startling breadth, the Court holds that commercial enterprises, including 
corporations, along with partnerships and sole proprietorships, can opt out 
of any law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible with their sin-
cerely held religious beliefs.”21 This was illustrated, according to Justice 
Ginsburg, by the majority’s easy dismissal of the contraceptive requirement, 
which Congress seemed to understand to be necessary to offset a “dispro-
portionate burden women carried for comprehensive health services and the 
adverse health consequences of excluding contraception from preventative 
care available to employees without cost sharing.”22 
The dissent noted that RFRA came about because Congress merely 
wanted to use legislation to restore the Court’s seeming constitutional de-
parture in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Ore-
gon v. Smith23 from its prior holdings in Sherbert v. Verner24 and Wisconsin 
v. Yoder.25 Congress wanted to return to the previous standard requiring the 
government “to justify any substantial burden on religiously motivated con-
duct by a compelling state interest and by means narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest,” even though the burden would have resulted from a 
rule of general applicability.26 
                                                                                                                           
(owners of a commercial establishment refused, on the basis of religious objections, to rent an event 
space to a same-sex couple for their wedding). 
 20 In other words, was the ACA overinclusive when it didn’t have to be? See KATHLEEN M. 
SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 644–47 (15th ed. 2004). 
 21 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 22 Id. at 2789. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent noted that “[t]he Senate voted down a so-called 
‘conscience amendment,’ which would have enabled any employer or insurance provider to deny 
coverage based on its asserted ‘religious beliefs or moral convictions.’” Id. at 2789–90 (citing 158 
Cong. Rec. S539 (Feb. 9, 2012)). For a more detailed review of the committee reports and state-
ments read on the House and Senate floors concerning RFRA’s intended effects, see Vincent J. 
Samar, The Potential Impact of Hobby Lobby on LGBT Civil Rights?, GEO. J. GENDER & L. 
(forthcoming 2016). 
 23 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2791 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Employment Div., Dept. 
of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). 
 24 Id. (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). 
 25 Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)). 
 26 Id. at n.9 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment)). 
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In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon 
v. Smith, the Court had ruled against a First Amendment challenge by “two 
members of the Native American Church” who “were dismissed from their 
jobs and denied unemployment because they ingested peyote at, and as an 
essential element of, a religious ceremony.”27 This had violated Oregon’s 
controlled substance law28 and was not protected by the First Amendment’s 
free exercise clause because the law was of general applicability and had 
not been enacted to burden religious exercise.29 The Court’s focus on Ore-
gon’s law being of general applicability rather than whether the Govern-
ment could show a compelling interest for allowing the law to burden reli-
gion is why Congress passed RFRA.30  
The dissent in Hobby Lobby did not adopt the majority’s view that the 
subsequent enactment of RLUIPA, where Congress had amended RFRA’s 
designation of “exercise of religion under the First Amendment” to only “ex-
ercise of religion” was intended to imply an intention by Congress to broaden 
the First Amendment test used in RFRA beyond what had been protected in 
Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder.31 Rather, the dissent saw it as an 
alteration of RLUIPA that clarified that courts “should not question the cen-
trality of a particular religious exercise.”32 It was not “meant to expand the 
class of entities qualified to mount religious accommodation claims, nor does 
it relieve courts of the obligation to inquire whether a government action sub-
stantially burdens a religious exercise.”33 Citing a House Report, the dissent 
claimed that Congress’s purpose in enacting RLUPIA was only to expand the 
types of practices RFRA protected, not to expand who would be protected,34 
or to prevent less than substantial burdens on religion.35 
                                                                                                                           
 27 Id. at 2790 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 878).  
 28 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (describing peyote as a Schedule I controlled substance). 
 29 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2790 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 
878).  
 30 Id. at 2791. 
 31 Compare Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (in passing RLUIPA, 
Congress did not intend to “expand the class of entities qualified to mount religious accommoda-
tion claims”), with 134 S. Ct. at 2762 n.5 (majority opinion) (in passing RLUIPA, Congress in-
tended “a complete separation from First Amendment case law”). 
 32 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 33 Id. 
 34 See id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 30 (1999)). 
 35 See id. (citing Henderson v. Kennedy, 265 F.3d 1072, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
2016] A New Separation of Church & State 7 
II. CONCERNS FOR THE FUTURE 
As of 2015, twenty-one states have adopted some form of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).36 In March 2015, Indiana came under fire 
when its governor signed an act similar to those in forty percent of the states 
“that would allow businesses to refuse services for religious reasons.”37 The 
legislation caused a particular uproar as the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) expressed concern over how athletes and employees 
might be affected prior to the “Final Four” basketball tournament in Indian-
apolis, and various gay rights groups called for boycotts of the state.38 The 
result of this backlash was an amendment to the Act in effect eliminating it 
from being used to justify denial of services to gay and lesbian people.39 
Unfortunately, as will be illustrated below, the same response has not 
proved true everywhere.40 
Clearly, the problems such legislation causes those whose actions 
might be viewed as contrary to religious beliefs is potentially wide ranging, 
including not only religious clergy who may refuse to officiate at a same-
sex wedding (which is already protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments),41 but also reception hall owners, florists, caterers, photogra-
phers, and others who may refuse services to those whose actions offend 
their religious beliefs.42 It may also implicate an employee’s ability to con-
tinue employment with a company whose owners object to their employee’s 
choice to enter a same-sex marriage or begin gender transition following a 
                                                                                                                           
 36 NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGIS., 2015 State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation (Aug. 7, 
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015-state-rfra-legislation.aspx [http://
perma.cc/KH4Q-RZSL]. 
 37 Hunter Schwartz, 19 States That Have ‘Religious Freedom’ Laws Similar to Indiana’s That No 
One Is Boycotting, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
fix/wp/2015/03/27/19-states-that-have-religious-freedom-laws-like-indianas-that-no-one-is-boycotting/ 
[http://perma.cc/KM92-8USJ]. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See Indiana Amends Religious Freedom Restoration Act to Prohibit Discrimination, NAT’L 
L. REV. (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/indiana-amends-religious-freedom-
restoration-act-to-prohibit-discrimination [http://perma.cc/37NH-QSQT]. 
 40 See infra notes 45–49 and accompanying text. For example, the Alabama state constitution 
provides a religious freedom restoration provision similar to state statutory RFRAs such as the one 
in Arkansas. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.  
 41 U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV. The First Amendment states: “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. The same limitations have been applied against the states via the incorporation doctrine 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296 (1940); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 42 Stephanie Wang, RFRA’s Roots Tied to Gay Marriage Fight, INDY STAR (Apr. 2, 2015, 
12:50 PM), http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/02/rfra-discrimination-concerns-
really-surprise/70820966/ [http://perma.cc/5NEE-KHJF]. 
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gender dysphonia diagnosis.43 This is because the breadth of the language 
of these statutes appears to allow discrimination and even limit the effect of 
antidiscrimination legislation unless the legislation specifically indicates 
that RFRA does not apply.44 
 Arkansas’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act exemplifies the signifi-
cant flexibility to make a claim that one’s religious rights were infringed. 
Section 1 provides the scope of what the legislature intended:  
 
It is the intent of the General Assembly:  
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. 
Verner . . . and Wisconsin v. Yoder . . . and to guarantee its appli-
cation in all cases in which free exercise of religion is substantial-
ly burdened; (2) That this Act be interpreted consistent with the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 . . . federal case law, 
and federal jurisprudence; and (3) To provide a claim or defense 
to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by 
government.45  
 It is noteworthy that nowhere in the Act does the legislature say what 
is meant by the all-important phrase “substantially burdened,” essentially 
leaving it to individual judges and juries to decide its meaning. What the 
statute actually does define reveals its breadth. In the “Definitions” section, 
the Act states that:  
(1) “Demonstrates” means meets the burden of going forward 
with the evidence and of persuasion; (2) “Exercise of religion” 
means religious exercise; (3) “Government” includes a branch, 
department, agency, instrumentality, political subdivision, official, 
or other person acting under color of state law; and (4) “State 
law” includes without limitation a law of a political subdivision.46  
 The fact that the term “religious exercise” is unqualified leaves the 
statute wide open to almost any claim that presents itself as spiritual, even 
though it may not be based on the dogma of any well-established religion. 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See Brynn Tannehill, What You Need to Know About Indiana’s RFRA, HUFFINGTON POST: 
GAY VOICES (May 30, 2015, 5:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brynn-tannehill/what-
you-need-to-know-abo_20_b_6970024.html [http://perma.cc/SN5Z-FK73]. 
 44 See id. 
 45 S.B. 975, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2015) (to be codified at ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-123-402) (citing Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb; Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). 
 46 Id. (to be codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-403). 
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In keeping with federal RFRA, the legislation does provide, under “Free 
exercise of religion protected” that: 
(a) A government shall not substantially burden a person’s free 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of gen-
eral applicability, except that a government may substantially 
burden a person’s free exercise of religion if it demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person is: (1) In furtherance of a 
compelling state interest; and (2) The least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest.47 
 However, once again, no limitation is provided as to the meaning of 
“least restrictive.” What if a florist does not want to sell flowers or a cake-
maker a cake, or a reception hall owner refuses to rent a space for a same-
sex wedding in a city or town that has an ordinance prohibiting discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation? Is the state government to then pro-
vide these services, especially if no other provider is available in the area? 
Section (b)(1) states: “A person whose religious exercise has been burdened 
in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in 
a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.”48 
So, if a florist or cake-maker has a change of heart for religious reasons the 
night before a same-sex wedding, the couple should have no recourse 
against the provider for breach of contract?  
 Finally, under “Construction and applicability,” the Act states that “(a) 
This subchapter applies to all state law, and the implementation of state law, 
whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the ef-
fective date of this act.”49 The shear breadth of the Arkansas statute’s lan-
guage appears to leave little room for any “burden on religion” not to be 
protected regardless of the harm to equality that may result. This particular-
ly applies for such state RFRA’s if interpreted along broad lines following 
Justice Alito’s majority opinion versus Justice Kennedy’s concurring opin-
ion in Hobby Lobby. In states that have resisted granting same-sex marriage 
from the outset, a question arises as to whether anti-discrimination legisla-
tion is safe unless it specifically disavows application of the relevant state 
RFRA. 
Professor Marci Hamilton describes the overall concern about these 
state RFRAs and their greater potential for discrimination compared to fed-
eral RFRA as follows: 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Id. (to be codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §16-123-404). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. (to be codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §16-123-405). 
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The original federal RFRA was misguided and a leap from prior 
First Amendment doctrine, but it was nothing like this new itera-
tion in the conservative states. First, it was never intended to ap-
ply in any case other than against the government, based on its 
plain language and its history, as the Seventh Circuit recently 
held . . . . 
 Second, as believers lost certain RFRA lawsuits, various ele-
ments were tightened in favor of the believer and against the gov-
ernment. For example, the definition of “religious exercise” has 
been expanded to mean beliefs not “central” to the faith, and 
“substantial burden” has either been watered down by definition 
or “substantial” removed so all the believer must prove is a de 
minimis burden on religious conduct. 
 Third, the newer, even more extreme free exercise statutes ap-
ply to disputes between private parties and, therefore, are not lim-
ited to suits in which the government is a party. Mississippi was 
the first to take a RFRA in that direction, but the freshly signed 
[but now amended] Indiana RFRA and the [recently enacted] Ar-
kansas RFRA share the same feature. Therefore, a business owner 
can invoke RFRA against a customer to keep them out; a private 
sector employer can use it to discriminate against employees; a 
hotel owner or apartment owner can screen out couples incon-
sistent with religious belief; or a parent can use it against a child’s 
legal rights.50 
The impact of these state RFRAs particularly concerns the lesbian, gay, bi-
sexual, and transgender community in light of the decision in Obergefell v. 
Hodges to recognize a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. 
III. OBERGEFELL V. HODGES AND WHAT THAT CASE SIGNIFIES FOR THE 
FUTURE OF STATE RFRAS 
The recent landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Obergefell v. Hodges 
came about following the Sixth Circuit’s consolidated rulings in four cases 
arising out of Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee that each held that 
states could legally ban same-sex marriage by making marriage a legally 
opposite-sex institution.51 As the Sixth Circuit was the first not to hold that 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Marci A. Hamilton, State RFRAs and the Intent to Discriminate: Why State RFRAs Are in 
Trouble, VERDICT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Mar. 30, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/03/30/
state-rfras-and-the-intent-to-discriminate-indiana-as-a-case-study [https://perma.cc/W5PC-WKDX]. 
 51 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593 (citing DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (2014)). In Michi-
gan, Kentucky, and Tennessee, state constitutional amendments defined marriage as a union be-
tween one man and one woman. KY. CONST. § 233A; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; TENN. CONST. 
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same-sex marriage was protected under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two 
questions arising from the decision. First, arising out of state constitutional 
bans from Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee, the Court considered “wheth-
er the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between 
two people of the same sex.”52 Second, arising out of the Ohio statute, the 
Court considered “whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to 
recognize a same-sex marriage licensed and performed in a State which 
does grant that right.”53 
In Ohio, Petitioner James Obergefell sought to be listed as the surviving 
spouse on his partner’s death certificate. After living together for two dec-
ades, the couple married on a medical transport plane in Baltimore, Maryland, 
because Arthur suffered from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) and Mary-
land, by voter referendum, legalized same-sex marriages.54 April DeBoer and 
Jayne Rowse, co-plaintiffs in the Michigan case, have three children by adop-
tion, two of whom require special care.55 Because Michigan only “permits 
opposite-sex married couples or single individuals to adopt,” April and Jayne 
were prevented from both being able to adopt all three children, raising ques-
tions about what might happen to the children were the adoptive parent to 
become incapacitated.56 Army Reserve Sergeant First Class Ijpe DeKoe mar-
ried his partner Thomas Kostura in New York prior to deploying to Afghani-
stan.57 When he returned to Tennessee to work full-time for the Army Re-
serve, Tennessee refused to recognize his lawful New York marriage.58 
A. The Majority Opinion: A Constitutional Right to Marriage 
In holding that “same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right 
to marry in all States,” Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, went on to 
state that “[i]t follows that the Court also must hold—and it now does 
hold—that there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse a lawful same-sex 
marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex charac-
ter.”59 In reaching this result, the Court took account of “[t]he ancient ori-
gins of marriage” but noted that “it has not stood in isolation from devel-
                                                                                                                           
art. XI, § 18. An Ohio statute similarly defined marriage. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01 (Lex-
isNexis 2004). 
 52 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 2594. 
 55 Id. at 2595. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See id. at 2604–05, 2607–08. 
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opments in law and society  . . . . The institution of marriage—even as con-
fined to opposite-sex relations—has evolved over time.”60 In its analysis, 
the Court emphasized that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment states that “no State shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law’” and noted that this includes protec-
tion for a fundamental right to marriage.61 
The Court described how the four principles and traditions that it rec-
ognizes to explain why marriage is a fundamental constitutional right “ap-
ply with equal force to same-sex couples.”62 First, Kennedy noted “that the 
right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of 
individual autonomy.”63 Kennedy pointed out that, because of this principal 
connection between marriage and liberty, the Court in Loving v. Virginia 
had previously relied on the Due Process Clause to invalidate interracial 
marriage bans.64 Here, Kennedy added that “[l]ike choices” applied in areas 
“concerning contraception, family relationships, procreation, and child rear-
ing” where a constitutional right to privacy is protected.65 
Justice Kennedy next stated “that the right to marry is fundamental be-
cause it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to 
the committed individuals.”66 This is consistent with a point I have argued 
elsewhere and which I developed from work by the philosopher Alan 
Gewirth: 
Because part of what I want to say here involves the usual legal 
bundle of rights and obligations we assign to marriage, it is only 
natural to focus on these rights and privileges as the primary in-
terests of the parties to the marriage. But in the more fundamental 
sense, the status of marriage for the individual participants is it-
self a new creation. After marriage, the couple assumes a new on-
tological identity, in which the participants see themselves as “us” 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Id. at 2595. 
 61 Id. at 2597–98 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) and Loving v. Virgin-
ia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)). 
 62 Id. at 2599. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 12). 
 65 Id. Justice Kennedy’s view here is consistent with a criticism I have elsewhere proffered 
against an alternative privacy conception where autonomy would be “protected only if there is a 
preexisting state of affairs (such as a marriage) in which the autonomy is expressed.” VINCENT J. 
SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: GAYS, LESBIANS AND THE CONSTITUTION 37 (1991). My con-
cern there was that requiring a marriage to already be in place “begs the question . . . in that it 
assumes without explanation that certain states of affairs are worthy of privacy protection while 
others are not.” Id. at 39. I then further noted that “[i]n a society that truly affirms autonomy as a 
fundamental end, lesbian and gay relationships should be granted recognition [as marriages] when 
consenting adults freely choose such relationships.” Id. at 151. 
 66 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589. 
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rather than “me,” just as they see their property as “ours” rather 
than “mine.” I do not suggest the creation of just another legal 
fiction, for the most important feature of marriage is not that the 
law should treat the parties and their property as a collective, 
though certainly it should. The most salient feature is that the par-
ties actually come to see themselves as a collective unit operating 
for their mutual benefit, and also as part of a still larger set of 
similarly situated persons.67 
Put another way, the importance of marriage starts not from “the external 
attributes of permanency, financial stability, or child rearing that society 
teaches should be sought from marriage.”68 Although the external attributes 
are important, they do not replace “the individual self-fulfillment that at-
tends being part of a corporate entity that shares both intimacy and identi-
ty.”69 This seems to be the larger point behind Justice Kennedy’s second 
principle. 
The third rationale for protecting the right to marriage is that “it safe-
guards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of 
childbearing, procreation, and education.”70 Justice Kennedy relied on his 
opinion in United States v. Windsor, the case that struck down, under the 
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Section 3 of the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act that had prohibited the federal government from recognizing a 
lawful state-approved same-sex marriage.71 Justice Kennedy acknowledged 
that “[b]y giving recognition and legal structure to their parents’ relation-
ship, marriage allows children ‘to understand the integrity and closeness of 
their own family and its concord with other families in their community and 
in their daily lives.’”72 
Finally, the majority emphasized the fundamental role that marriage 
plays in society.73 Citing Maynard v. Hill,74 Kennedy wrote that the Court 
there “echoed de Tocqueville, explaining that marriage is ‘the foundation of 
the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization 
nor progress.’”75 Kennedy seems to understand that the modern family is 
                                                                                                                           
 67 Vincent J. Samar, Privacy and Same-Sex Marriage: The Case for Treating Same-Sex Mar-
riage as a Human Right, 68 MONT. L. REV. 335, 345–46 (2007) (citations omitted). 
 68 Id. at 347. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 71 See id. at 2597, 2599, 2600–01. 
 72 Id. (Citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694). Justice Kennedy stated that mar-
riage “affords the permanency and stability important to children’s best interests.” Id. 
 73 Id. (“[T]his Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone 
of our social order.”). 
 74 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
 75 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601. 
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not confined simply to heterosexual parents with their biological children. 
The modern family may include biological and non-biological children or 
no children at all. It may have one parent or two persons in the role of par-
ents.76 To truly accommodate the modern family and all its needs in service 
to the creation of society, same-sex marriage must be recognized. 77  As 
Kennedy noted, “[t]here is no difference between same- and opposite-sex 
couples with respect to this principle.”78 
Finally, while the majority opinion in Obergefell did not focus on 
Equal Protection, it did note: 
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are con-
nected in a profound way, though they set forth independent prin-
ciples. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal pro-
tection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-
extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the 
meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case one Clause 
may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accu-
rate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may con-
verge in the identification and definition of the right.79 
In further illustrating this point Kennedy looked to the Court’s decision in 
other right-to-marry cases. First, Kennedy looked to the decision in Loving 
v. Virginia that struck down the ban on interracial marriage under both the 
Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.80 Kennedy then point-
ed to the use of the Equal Protection Clause in Zablocki v. Redhail to invali-
date a law that prohibited fathers who were behind on child support pay-
ments from marrying without prior judicial approval as violating a right “of 
fundamental importance.”81 
It seems that Justice Kennedy understands the word “equal” as used in 
the Equal Protection Clause to incorporate two different meanings that cre-
ate an ambiguity in the way the Clause is understood. On the one hand, 
“equal protection” means providing the same protection—whatever that 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Id. 
 77 See generally Anthony Niedwiecki, Save Our Children: Overcoming the Narrative That Gays 
and Lesbians Are Harmful to Children, 21 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 125, 161–71 (2013) (ana-
lyzing two cases in which courts have found that being raised by same-sex parents does not harm 
children); Margaret Weigel & Leighton Walter Kille, Same-Sex Marriage and Children’s Well-
Being: Research Roundup, JOURNALIST’S RESOURCE (June 26, 2015), http://journalistsresource.
org/studies/society/gender-society/same-sex-marriage-children-well-being-research-roundup [http://
perma.cc/JT6N-D5TM] (listing titles, abstracts, and findings of several scholarly research papers and 
studies on psychosocial and educational outcomes for children raised by same-sex parents). 
 78 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 79 Id. at 2602–03. 
 80 Id. at 2603. 
 81 Id. (citing Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 383). 
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may be—in cases that are similarly situated. This formal sense of equality is 
consistent with a long tradition of how the word has been used going back 
at least to Aristotle who, in referencing Plato, refers to “treating like cases 
alike.” 82 While this view of equality is certainly consistent with the idea of 
formal justice, it does not, as the philosopher Alan Gewirth has pointed out, 
get at the material requirement necessary to achieve full equal justice.83 Pla-
to acknowledged the need for a material sense of justice when he spoke of 
“rendering to each his due.”84 That material requirement comes in by way 
of the Due Process Clause, which insures that the qualifying characteristic 
not be itself a façade for covering over an inequality to the rights all humans 
should have qua human.85  
This was made very clear in Loving v. Virginia, where the U.S. Su-
preme Court struck down Virginia’s miscegenation statute as a violation of 
both the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right to marry and the Equal 
Protection Clause.86 Following a strictly formalistic interpretation of equali-
ty, Virginia argued that its miscegenation statutes did not violate Equal Pro-
tection because the penalty imposed applied equally to all races.87 In effect, 
Virginia argued that any distribution of rights or benefits, or detriments for 
that matter, should have been considered just, regardless of the qualifying 
characteristic for the distribution, provided that the penalty, according to 
Virginia, was the same for all people.88 Had the Court adopted this view in 
Loving, then Virginia’s claim that its miscegenation statute was constitu-
tionally acceptable because it prohibited every white person from marrying 
outside his or her race should have been accepted. According to Virginia, 
the statute application was the same for all people in the state in that a white 
individual could not marry outside his or her race and neither could a non-
white individual marry a white person.89 Virginia argued that the qualifying 
characteristic of being “white” should not be the issue, but rather the stat-
                                                                                                                           
 82 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, 3.1131a10–3.1131b15 (Terence Irwin trans., 
Hackett Publishing Co. 2nd ed. 1999) (c. 350 B.C.E.); ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. III, 9.1280a8–
9.1280a 15, 12.1282b18–12.1282b23 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1998) (c. 350 
B.C.E.). 
 83 ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS 71–72 (1996). 
 84 PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Bk. 1, 331e–332a (c. 350 B.C.E.). 
 85 “Against Plato and Aristotle, the classical formula for justice according to which an action is 
just when it offers each individual his or her due took on a substantively egalitarian meaning in the 
course of time, viz. everyone deserved the same dignity and the same respect. This is now the widely 
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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (June 27, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equality/ [http://
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 86 Loving, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 87 Id. at 8. 
 88 See id. at 7–8. 
 89 Id. at 8. 
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ute’s equal application.90 However, the Court unqualifiedly rejected Virgin-
ia’s equal application argument: 
 There can be no question but that Virginia’s miscegenation 
statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race. The 
statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct if engaged in by 
members of different races. Over the years, this Court has con-
sistently repudiated ‘[d]istinctions between citizens solely be-
cause of their ancestry’ as being ‘odious to a free people whose 
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.’ At the very 
least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifica-
tions, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the 
‘most rigid scrutiny,’ and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must 
be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permis-
sible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination 
which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to elimi-
nate. Indeed, two members of this Court have already stated that 
they ‘cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose . . . which 
makes the color of a person’s skin the test of whether his conduct 
is a criminal offense.’91 
The Court is pointing to the fact that equal protection is not satisfied if 
the qualifying classification cannot “be shown to be necessary to the ac-
complishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial 
discrimination which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
eliminate.”92 Because the classification was race-based, the Court applied 
the strictest scrutiny. However, questions remain as to what would occur if 
the classification were gender- or sexual orientation-based. Elsewhere, the 
Court has noted that gender-based classifications require heightened scruti-
ny to ensure they are not based upon illegitimate stereotypes.93 The Court 
has never said exactly what level of scrutiny should apply to sexual orienta-
tion discrimination. However, this may not matter in regard to marriage be-
cause marriage is a fundamental right and equality considerations demon-
strate that, because same-sex marriage is now understood to be part of mar-
                                                                                                                           
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 11 (citations omitted). 
 92 Id. 
 93 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996) (quoting Wengler v. Druggists Mut. 
Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)). In United States v. Virginia, the court noted that Virginia 
must demonstrate “at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental 
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achieve-
ment of those objectives.” Id. at 524. 
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riage, it is protected by strict scrutiny. This is the instruction for the future 
that the Court in Loving provided when it said:  
Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamen-
tal to our very existence and survival. To deny this fundamental 
freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications 
embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive 
of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, is surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without 
due process of law.94 
The equality that should inform fundamental rights analysis spills over 
into areas in which the Court has never said that non-marital sexual rela-
tions implicated a fundamental right. This is exhibited by the opinions in 
Lawrence v. Texas,95 which relied on the Fourteenth Amendment to strike 
down a Texas statute prohibiting same-sex, noncommercial, consensual 
sexual activity in private, as well as in United States v. Windsor,96 which 
held unconstitutional, under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Sec-
tion 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act,97 which had prohibited the federal 
government from recognizing a same-sex marriage that was valid in the 
state where it was performed. Both cases would seem to require that the 
State show more than merely a rational basis for discrimination based on 
sexual orientation. Although neither said this was because of a fundamental 
right, the line of cases cited in the Lawrence decision, beginning with Gris-
wold v. Connecticut98 and continuing through Roe v. Wade99 and Carey v. 
Population Services, International 100 may suggest that Due Process itself 
necessitates raising the Equal Protection standard for reviewing sexual ori-
entation discrimination to heightened scrutiny. 
Certainly, Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Obergefell seems to be in line 
with this direction when he writes: “In Lawrence the Court acknowledged 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (citations omitted). 
 95 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003). 
 96 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013). 
 97 Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996), invalidated by U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
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the interlocking nature of these constitutional safeguards in the context of 
the legal treatment of gays and lesbians. Although Lawrence elaborated its 
holding under the Due Process Clause, it acknowledged, and sought to rem-
edy, the continuing inequality that resulted from laws making intimacy in 
the lives of gays and lesbians a crime against the State.”101 Kennedy con-
firms that equality should play a significant role in determining the extent of 
protection for rights deemed fundamental under the Due Process Clause 
when stating that “the marriage laws enforced by the respondents are in es-
sence unequal: same-sex couples are denied all the benefits afforded to op-
posite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right.”102 
All of this goes to show that, for the majority in Obergefell, equality is not 
just a formal concept, but carries material weight requiring deprivations of 
fundamental rights to be supported by compelling reasons. Where such rea-
sons are not present, the right must be upheld independent of what might 
otherwise be acceptable were the classification to involve the denial of 
something less than a fundamental right. 
B. The Dissenting Opinions 
The dissents’ criticisms of the majority’s position in Obergefell are un-
persuasive. Chief Justice Roberts’s argument that there is no constitutional 
right that requires changing the definition of marriage from what it tradi-
tionally had meant misses an important constitutional structural thread of 
the majority opinion. 103 Kennedy clearly states: “The identification and 
protection of fundamental rights is an enduring part of the judicial duty to 
interpret the Constitution. That responsibility, however, ‘has not been re-
duced to any formula.’ Rather, it requires courts to exercise reasoned judg-
ment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State 
must accord them its respect.”104 Consequently, it would not be appropriate 
to leave the matter to a popular vote when the whole point of the Constitu-
tion is to restrict government, in this case the political branches, from un-
dermining the basic rights of the people.105 
                                                                                                                           
 101 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (citations omitted). 
 102 Id. (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)). 
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Justice Scalia’s dissent follows his usual line of limiting constitutional 
interpretations to the expectations of the framers. In this, he is certainly cor-
rect in his belief that “it is unquestionable that the People who ratified [the 
Fourteenth Amendment] did not understand it to prohibit a practice that re-
mained both universal and uncontroversial in the years after ratification.”106 
However, Scalia fails to acknowledge Kennedy’s point that “[t]he genera-
tions that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimen-
sions, and so they entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the 
right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn its meaning.”107 Indeed, this 
seems implicit by the choice of language that the framers adopted in setting 
out the Fourteenth Amendment, an approach Scalia himself claims to follow 
when interpreting federal statutes.108 The framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment chose abstract words such as “Due Process” and “Equal Protection,” 
when they clearly had available and used elsewhere in the Constitution and 
Bill of Rights more concrete language. 109  Undoubtedly, they intended to 
leave the language open for future generations to consider questions concern-
ing the deeper philosophical meanings of these Clauses. Thus, each genera-
tion could resolve for itself how these Clauses should be implemented based 
on their own understandings of human nature and society.110 
Justice Thomas’s dissent adopts a two-part attack.111 First, he asserts 
that, historically, “liberty [including the liberty referred to in the Due Pro-
cesses Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments] has been under-
stood as freedom from government action, not entitlement to government 
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benefits.”112 Second, he disagrees with the majority’s view that recognizing 
same-sex marriage protects human dignity.113 Whether it is true that the 
country initially saw liberty as freedom from governmental interference as 
opposed to freedom to various benefits, the logic of liberty remains in that 
every instance of freedom from is an instance of freedom to.114 To have 
freedom from government interference with, for example, my freedom of 
speech when it does not involve a clear and present danger to others or a 
defamation of a private person, is of no consequence if, because of govern-
mental policies, I do not have the means to express myself or the opportuni-
ty to do so.115 “Freedom from,” if it is to be of any consequence, must al-
ways be connected with a freedom to a benefit—at least where it is the gov-
ernment that controls access to the benefit.116 With regard to human dignity, 
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Id. at 25–26. 
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2016] A New Separation of Church & State 21 
Justice Thomas is correct to believe that government or society does not 
bestow human dignity, but it does not follow from this that government or 
society has no role in the maintenance, preservation, or self-awareness of 
dignity. Human dignity supervenes on human rights.117 Where human rights 
are readily ignored or denied, the dignity that supervenes on those rights is 
effectively lost.118 When the government denies a fundamental right, such 
as the right to marry the person of one’s choice, to a specific class of indi-
viduals for no compelling reason, those persons’ basic standing as citizens 
is reduced to a lower level, not only in the minds of their fellow citizens, 
but often in their own minds. If an individual is not respected by the state 
and by the society, then this disrespect will most likely implicate their own 
psychological understanding of themselves. 
Justice Alito’s dissent focuses more on different historical understand-
ings of marriage and argues that it should be left to the states to decide 
which understanding they prefer to adopt.119 He writes, “It is far beyond the 
outer reaches of this Court’s authority to say that a State may not adhere to 
the understanding of marriage that has long prevailed, not just in this coun-
try and others with similar cultural roots, but also in a great variety of coun-
tries and cultures all around the globe.”120 The difficulty with Justice Alito’s 
position is that it privileges cultural norms as if the democratic process were 
the only way to determine them. As the majority in Obergefell noted, insti-
tutions, including those following long-standing cultural norms, are not out-
side the protections the Constitution affords.121 This is as true where the 
long-standing norms may have been to deny making the institution of mar-
                                                                                                                           
 117 Alan Gewirth notes: 
[H]uman rights are grounded in human dignity or worth. For it is from the worth 
that each agent attributes to her purposes and hence, a fortiori, to herself as purpos-
ive agent that there necessarily follows the claiming of rights to the necessary condi-
tions of acting in pursuit of those purposes. Since she must acknowledge that the 
rights are had by all humans equally, this also serves to impose a universalist moral 
restriction on the purposes she is justified in regarding as worth pursuing, and hence, 
too, on her ascription of worth or dignity to herself. 
ALAN GEWIRTH, SELF-FULFILLMENT 170 (1998). 
 118 Gewirth concludes: “Thus, although the existence of human rights follows dialectically 
from the worth or dignity that every agent must attribute to himself, the content of that dignity is 
in turn morally modified by the universal and equal human rights in which the argument eventu-
ates.” Id. In other words, where human rights are not accorded universal and equal status, though 
dialectically the individual might claim those rights, the psychological contents of the self-worth 
upon which they are founded may be seriously impaired, if not destroyed, by its failure to be 
acknowledged by other human actors. See id. at 85–86. 
 119 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 2598 (majority opinion). 
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riage available to interracial couples as to those fathers who are behind in 
their child support, or even to those confined to prison.122 
IV. RESOLVING CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE RIGHT TO MARRY AND THE 
FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION 
The thrust of Obergefell v. Hodges clarifies that same-sex marriage is 
within the definition of marriage that the Constitution protects. Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby emphasized Congress’s recognition of the importance of the 
free exercise of religion against limitation by rules of general applicability 
so that only when a compelling state interest is present that is narrowly 
drawn may the state interfere with the free exercise right.123 In this Part, I 
take up the issue of the limitations a Hobby Lobby-like analysis might have 
with regard to state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs) in which 
a private person or state actor claims a private free exercise right not to par-
ticipate in, or officiate at, a same-sex wedding, whether it be by performing 
an official duty or in providing a business service. The two issues need not 
necessarily be the same, since prevention of private sector discrimination 
requires the presence of a relevant antidiscrimination statute that would not 
be necessary in the public realm where the discrimination denies a funda-
mental right that the government is constitutionally obligated to recognize. I 
will treat the official refusing to assist a same-sex marriage first, as a faux 
conflict of rights. Then, I will review the justification for antidiscrimination 
statutes concerning limitations on organizations or businesses seeking to 
discriminate against same-sex married couples. 
A. Faux Conflicts of Rights 
There is no conflict of rights when a government official refuses, on 
religious grounds, to provide a license for or to officiate at a same-sex mar-
riage. Unlike the right to the free exercise of religion, the right to marry is 
not an active right that allows the right-holder to perform an action, but is a 
passive right in which the holder of the right has a claim to a benefit.124 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987), Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384 (1978), 
and Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (1967)). 
 123 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2767. 
 124 As I have described elsewhere:  
Active rights are those that permit the holder of the right to perform an action, such 
as making a speech, publishing a news report, or practicing a religious belief. Active 
rights involve negative freedom in the sense that the respondent of the right has a 
duty not to interfere with the holder in the performance of the right. In contrast, pas-
sive rights are those that afford the subject a benefit, such as trial by his peers, a 
speedy and public trial, and the right to the assistance of counsel. Passive rights in-
volve positive freedom in the sense that the respondent of the right has the duty to 
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The free exercise of religion is an active right because it permits the 
rights holder to perform or not perform some action without interference of 
government.125 By contrast, the right to same-sex marriage is a passive right 
in that it requires government not to deny the benefits of marriage to same-
sex couples.126 The two rights cannot conflict because, insofar as govern-
ment has an obligation to provide same-sex marriage while not otherwise 
establishing a religion, it cannot at the same time assert a right to religious 
free exercise in furtherance of a specific religious view. 
Here it might be questioned if the right to marry someone of the same-
sex is really a passive right in that the benefits do not just result from mar-
rying, but also result from a license that enables the individuals to marry 
and to have a public official officiate. However, this confuses an opportuni-
ty to act that arises from a benefit conveyed with a right to perform an ac-
tion, independent of any benefit, without interference. The exercise of reli-
gion is, for example, not dependent on the existence of any government 
benefit any more than are the exercises of freedom of speech, press, or as-
sembly. 127  By contrast, access to a civil marriage by same-sex couples, 
which is the right being considered here, only exists at the behest of gov-
ernment.128 Surely, the Court in Obergefell referred to the latter in holding 
that both heterosexual and homosexual couples have a “fundamental right 
to marry” and further that “there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to 
recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the 
ground of its same-sex character.”129 The Court did not say same-sex cou-
ples are free to civilly marry without interference as if civil marriage existed 
absent government approval. Nor is the analysis changed by recasting the 
issue as not whether the government can withhold the right to marry some-
one of the same-sex, but as whether a governmental official, such as a clerk 
or a judge, can refuse to assist the satisfaction of the right because she has a 
religious objection. 
Put another way, from the standpoint of the official the issue is wheth-
er she has to issue a marriage license or officiate at a marriage ceremony 
because it is her job, or whether she is free to recuse herself based on her 
                                                                                                                           
afford the holder certain benefits. The relevant difference between active and pas-
sive rights is that while in the former case the holder of the right is free to perform 
certain actions, in the latter case the holder of the right merely has a valid claim 
against the respondent to afford certain benefits. 
SAMAR, supra note 65, at 104–05. 
 125 See id. 
 126 See id. 
 127 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment protects all three of these rights from 
governmental interference. See id. 
 128 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607–08 (2015). 
 129 Id. at 2608. 
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religious belief. For example, following the Obergefell decision, County 
Clerk Kim Davis of Kentucky, after having previously tried blocking her 
subordinates from providing same-sex couples marriage license assistance 
on religious grounds, refused to have her name put on same-sex marriage 
licenses in Kentucky, even though state law arguably requires all licenses to 
bear the county clerk’s signature.130 In this context, the right of the couple 
seeking to get married may appear as an active right that derives from their 
passive right to marry in that it requires the government official to do her 
job subject to a mandamus. The government official’s claimed right to ob-
ject also appears to operate as an active right to the free exercise of her reli-
gion not to be forced to act contrary to conscience. But this is not a correct 
analysis of the situation. 
The problem in following out this analysis is that it potentially under-
mines any benefits the government may be constitutionally obligated to be-
stow. While the government official maintains a personal free exercise 
right, the question becomes whether she can claim that right in her capacity 
as a public employee.131 If the official were merely an employee in a private 
sector job refusing to provide a service to a customer, then, absent an anti-
discrimination statute, the person’s ability to refuse to assist the customer 
would be at the sole discretion of her employer. But, here the employer is 
the government, which itself is subject to constitutional limitations. In the 
official’s public sector role, the government has already acknowledged the 
existence of the constitutional right to same-sex marriage as part of the fun-
damental right to marry.132 As such, the official is in a role quite different 
from that of any citizen, qua citizen, to the free exercise of her religious 
belief. In this case, the conflict is really whether the passive right to marry 
will be undermined by government officials determined not to perform their 
proper role, not whether the individual’s right to religious free exercise is 
undermined in her private citizen capacity. Because the right to marry under 
this circumstance would be rendered impotent if government officials could 
so easily recuse themselves, government employees operating in an official 
capacity have no constitutional defense to refuse to fully perform their con-
stitutional duty. 
                                                                                                                           
 130 Are Marriage Licenses Without Kim Davis’ Signature Valid?, LGBTQ NATION (Sept. 15, 
2015), http://www.lgbtqnation.com/2015/09/are-marriage-licenses-without-kim-davis-signature-valid/ 
[http://perma.cc/7ZVB-LR84]. 
 131 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23–26, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) 
(No. 14-556). 
 132 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607–08. 
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The First Amendment Establishment Clause implies that a government 
official’s religious beliefs cannot interfere with the work of the office.133 
That provision pairs with the Free Exercise Clause where both provide that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”134 Where a government official refus-
es to issue a constitutionally required marriage license or officiate at the 
legally required ceremony, the fundamental right of the couple to marry is 
effectively rendered null. More significantly, were state officials generally 
allowed to pick and choose whose marriages they would serve, according to 
their own individual religious beliefs, the result would be the very estab-
lishment of religion by the various officials (and not even consistently) that 
the First Amendment prohibits.135 For the official who disagrees with same-
sex marriage, nothing more is implied as to her issuance of a license or offi-
ciating at a ceremony than her willingness to perform the constitutional du-
ties assigned by her office. Obviously, if the officer finds even this much 
engagement with her job to be too burdensome given her personal religious 
or moral values, she is certainly free to resign and perhaps should do so.136 
However, she cannot claim the privilege of her office while simultaneously 
denying the constitutional obligations it imposes. 
Nor should there be available the defense that someone else in the of-
fice may step in for the objecting official in the way a private grocery store 
has an over twenty-one year old employee step in for an underage clerk to 
post a liquor purchase. In the latter case, the private grocery store is operat-
ing within the requirement of the law. Here, the problem is not just that 
there may not be another person in the office to perform the job in the area 
where the office is located, although that situation could certainly arise in an 
office with few employees as might be the case in less populated areas. The 
problem is that a governmental official cannot maintain her position while 
simultaneously failing to perform the constitutional duties required of that 
position. 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Cf. U.S. CONST. amend I, which applies against state officials via the incorporation clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. This follows a point that Justice Ginsberg made in her dissent in Hobby Lobby where 
she said: “Indeed, approving some religious claims while deeming others unworthy of accommo-
dation could be ‘perceived as favoring one religion over another,’ the very ‘risk the Establishment 
Clause was designed to preclude.’” See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 
2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982)). 
 136 As an accommodation, the officer might be allowed unemployment compensation if it 
would otherwise be available for a termination not based on cause because the resignation results 
from a material change in her job description, after she accepted it, that is seriously at odds with 
her religious beliefs. 
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Nor is this problem confined to persons who hold specific appointed or 
elected offices. Every priest, minister, rabbi, or imam who officiates at 
weddings and is empowered by the state to confirm the marriage is, in that 
capacity, an official of the state bound by the constitutional duties required 
to approve the marriage.137 If such a person chooses not to officiate at the 
marriage of individuals of the same sex or two people of different races, he 
violates his constitutional duty and should not be permitted to continue in 
his official governmental role. This does not mean that a clergy person 
should be in any way prevented from performing a religious marriage ser-
vice, which is guaranteed through the Free Exercise Clause.138 It just means 
that the religious service cannot operate as a civil ceremony, even if the civ-
il ceremony could be deemed to overlap. To not acknowledge the separation 
would be for the state to choose whom it will allow to get married contrary 
to what the Constitution requires.139 
Differentiating between the civil and religious aspects of marriage is not 
revolutionary. France separates civil and religious marriage, giving legal 
recognition only to the former.140 Consequently, if a couple in France also 
wants a religious marriage they must precede it first with a civil marriage.141 
A similar procedure applies in Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and in 
Spain; in Germany marriages must be conducted by a state official to be le-
gally binding.142 With the successful examples to look to around the globe, 
acknowledging the differences between civil and religious ceremonies will 
not be the disaster some may have predicted would result from allowing 
same-sex marriage.143 Instead, after courts begin to hear these cases and legis-
                                                                                                                           
 137 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 24–25, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) 
(No. 14-556). 
 138 U.S. CONST., amend I; see Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607. 
 139 This reflects a question Justice Scalia raised at oral argument and that was again raised by 
Justice Thomas in dissent. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23–26, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. 
Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556); see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(citing Brief of the General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists and the Becket Fund for Reli-
gious Liberty as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party as Amici Curiae at 5). 
 140 Jonathan Luxmoore, European Countries Distinguish Between Religious, Civil Marriages, 
NAT’L CATHOLIC REPORTER (Apr. 15, 2015), http://ncronline.org/news/global/european-countries-
distinguish-between-religious-civil-marriages [http://perma.cc/ZHS7-XUDP]. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2606–07 (addressing the argument that allowing same-sex 
marriage will harm the institution of marriage). For a related discussion of how marriage and other 
LGBT issues are dealt with globally, see Vincent J. Samar, A Gewirthian Framework for Protect-
ing the Basic Human Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered (LGBT) People, in 
GEWIRTHIAN PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS, (Per Bauhn ed.) (forthcoming 2016) (including 
an analysis of data regarding same-sex sexual activity and recognition of same-sex relationships 
from over 197 sources from around the world, and arguing that the basic human rights claimed by 
LGBT people, including the right to marry, are supported by the U.S. Constitution, international 
law documents, and also the writings of philosopher Alan Gewirth). 
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latures offer their resolutions of the matter, a dual system may be created that 
operates virtually seamlessly for those who want their civil marriage to be 
religiously validated. It may require two ceremonies; or a state official might 
attend a religious ceremony and perform her function there (although inde-
pendent of the religious ceremony). Or, the couple signing the license at the 
Clerk’s office might indicate the time and date that their civil marriage will 
begin and make it overlap their religious ceremony. Whichever method is 
chosen, from a constitutional rights point of view, the result will be an affir-
mation of both the autonomy of the individual to marry and of religious 
groups to operate in keeping with their own dogmas. 
B. Antidiscrimination Legislation 
Non-State actors who object to being in any way connected to a same-
sex marriage must also be considered. This includes persons engaged in 
various private businesses that might provide wedding planning, a reception 
hall, a florist service, catering facilities, photography services, musical ar-
rangements, or other benefits. What impact, if any, might the decision in 
Obergefell v. Hodges have with regard to these individuals? 
Obergefell does not impact whether private services will be made avail-
able because it concerns only the constitutional obligation of the State to 
make same-sex marriage available.144 It does not directly implicate individual 
non-State actors who might object to being part of a same-sex wedding. Such 
a limitation on private sector actors would require a state or federal antidis-
crimination law such as those specifically prohibiting sexual orientation dis-
crimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations, or inter-
preting an existing federal statute prohibiting sex discrimination to accom-
plish the same end.145 However, when considered alongside states that have 
already enacted antidiscrimination laws, Obergefell v. Hodges provides a 
powerful justification for a state court to find that its laws do bar private sec-
tor discrimination of same-sex marriages. It similarly provides support for the 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) recent interpre-
tation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, that sexual orientation 
discrimination constitutes a form of sex discrimination in violation of Title 
VII.146 This violation occurs notwithstanding any RFRA that might also be 
present. 
                                                                                                                           
 144 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607. 
 145 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; Fair Housing Act of 
1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. 
 146 In a recent decision by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
involving a Supervisory Air Traffic Control Specialist who alleged that he was denied promotion 
to “a permanent position as a Front Line Manager at the Miami Tower TRACON facility” because 
of his sexual orientation, the Commission concluded “that allegations of discrimination on the 
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Despite the way some commentators may have sought to invite their 
state courts to adopt a Hobby Lobby-like interpretation for their state 
RFRAs, Obergefell’s language of equality affords compelling reasons for 
state and federal courts to decline to do so. This can be seen when one looks 
at the Obergefell language regarding the role Equal Protection plays in un-
derstanding Due Process and fundamental rights.147 Justice Kennedy writes: 
There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples 
with respect to this principle. Yet by virtue of their exclusion from 
that institution, same-sex couples are denied the constellation of 
benefits that the States have linked to marriage. This harm results 
in more than just material burdens. Same-sex couples are con-
signed to an instability many opposite-sex couples would deem 
intolerable in their own lives. As the State itself makes marriage 
all the more precious by the significance it attaches to it, exclu-
sion from that status has the effect of teaching that gays and les-
bians are unequal in important respects. It demeans gays and les-
bians for the State to lock them out of a central institution of the 
Nation’s society.148 
The majority opinion is acknowledging that same-sex couples have 
suffered historical discrimination by their exclusion from marriage. This 
exclusion is founded upon no relevant legal difference between them and 
their opposite-sex counterparts.149 Furthermore, this creates a harm that op-
posite-sex couples would not tolerate.150 The only reason same-sex couples 
have been excluded is that they lack the political power to prevent the State 
from locking them out of this “central institution of the Nation’s society.”151 
                                                                                                                           
basis of sexual orientation necessarily state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex” under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-17; EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, 2, 14 (2015). 
Although the appeal was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), specifically concerning “person-
nel actions affecting (federal) employees or applicants for employment,” the Commission stated: 
“This provision is analogous to the section of Title VII governing employment discrimination in 
the private sector at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1),” stating that “it is unlawful for a covered employer 
to ‘fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
. . . sex.’” Id. at 5. In reaching its decision, the Commission cited a number of Title VII precedents 
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ing same-sex marriage] abridge central precepts of equality. Here the marriage laws enforced by 
the respondents are in essence unequal: same-sex couples are denied all the benefits afforded to 
opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right.” Id. at 7. 
 147 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–03. 
 148 Id. at 2590. 
 149 Id. 
 150 See id. 
 151 Id. 
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Although finding a Due Process violation does not first require finding a 
suspect classification, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion all but finds 
same-sex couples to be a suspect class by virtue of their having been ex-
cluded from marriage.152 This reading suggests that antidiscrimination laws 
are supported by a compelling reason for insuring that same-sex couples not 
continue to be denied as a class all incidents of marriage, including those 
made available only by way of the private sector. 
Hobby Lobby acknowledged that RFRA requires that such laws must be 
narrowly drawn, which certainly is also present in state RFRAs.153 Justice 
Kennedy emphasized in his concurrence in Hobby Lobby that the Department 
of Health and Human Services had already put in place for nonprofits “an 
existing, recognized, workable, and already-implemented framework to pro-
vide coverage.”154 Hobby Lobby had a uniquely simple alternative solution 
that will not be available in every RFRA conflict. Because such an alternative 
is not present in cases where private businesses refuse services to same-sex 
couples getting married, Kennedy’s concurring opinion implies that state and 
federal restrictions on such businesses are necessary to avoid discrimination 
and will generally satisfy the RFRA requirement of being narrowly drawn. 
Still, yet to be considered is what impact such antidiscrimination laws 
might have regarding those whose jobs or housing might be affected be-
cause they choose to enter into a civilly recognized, constitutionally provid-
ed for, same-sex marriage.155 Opportunities for discrimination might arise 
if, for example, a couple attending a religious based school is seeking mar-
ried student housing or an employee seeks to keep her non-clerical job at a 
religious institution after announcing her plans to marry. I believe the con-
siderations applicable for interpreting such laws to prohibit florists or cater-
ers from failing to serve a same-sex wedding would apply with equal 
strength in the employment and housing areas, depending on how they are 
written. 
                                                                                                                           
 152 Finding a fundamental right does not necessarily imply the presence of a suspect class. Cf. 
Turner, 482 U.S. at 99 (1987) (holding that Missouri’s “almost complete ban on the decision to 
marry is not reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives”). Justice Kennedy’s language 
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cluded from marriage. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2590. 
 153 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779. 
 154 Id. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 155 In EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, the EEOC noted that the U.S. District Court for the 
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Often, non-profit institutions such as schools and colleges are allowed 
exemptions if the promotion of religion is a central focus of their mission 
because the free exercise of religion in this context dominates in the service 
of liberty over the society’s interest in equality. Here, state law determines 
the interests it wants to protect as compelling. However, a statutory inter-
pretation question arises concerning whether a school or college, which 
continues to discriminate against same-sex couples based on religious be-
lief, can be afforded a tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code in 
light of the recent EEOC ruling. 156 Where commercial landlords are in-
volved, antidiscrimination laws ought to operate to protect same-sex mar-
ried couples. There, the choice not to rent to a same-sex married couple is 
likely to run afoul of antidiscrimination laws in employment, housing, and 
public accommodations, just as an employer who fires an employee simply 
because he or she entered into a same-sex marriage would run afoul of these 
laws.157 The burden on the couple’s choice to marry is consequential and, if 
the antidiscrimination law prohibits the discrimination, Hobby Lobby cer-
tainly provides no solace from the effect of that law. 
More interesting perhaps is how Obergefell might alter state laws, such 
as the law in Michigan that allows adoption agencies to refuse placements 
with same-sex couples if it would offend their religious beliefs.158 Because 
statutory rather than constitutional law governs this area, will adoption cen-
ters with religious affiliations, such as Catholic Charities, now be afforded a 
religious exemption? These institutions refuse to place children with same-
sex couples whether they are married or not.159 Prior to Obergefell, Catholic 
Charities in Illinois and Massachusetts pulled out of adoptions to avoid hav-
ing to make these placements.160 Now, Catholic Charities Illinois has backed 
out of seeking taxpayer assistance so that it can continue to support only op-
posite-sex adoptions.161 Catholic Charities admits it has no First Amendment 
                                                                                                                           
 156 EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, 2, 14 (2015); cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. 
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washingtontimes.com/news/2006/mar/14/20060314-010603-3657r/ [http://perma.cc/3872-3E5V]. 
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right to State funding and instead claims a First Amendment right not to have 
its religious beliefs prevent it from accessing state funds on a par with other 
organizations.162 While it remains unclear what further limitation the Oberge-
fell case might afford in this area, it cannot be denied that continuing taxpayer 
support for faith-based organizations that discriminate will not likely be going 
away anytime soon.163 The bottom line is that same-sex marriage is not going 
away either, and the difficult problem of locating the boundary between reli-
gious liberty and the right to marry will likely be with us for some time to 
come.164 
CONCLUSION 
In this article I have sought to show how the U.S. Supreme Court’s re-
cent decision in Obergefell v. Hodges is likely to impact analogies in the 
Hobby Lobby case regarding state RFRA statutes. It now seems clear from 
the Obergefell majority opinion that such statutes should not necessarily 
trump antidiscrimination statutes, at least insofar as they are applied in ser-
vice to same-sex couples obtaining the benefits of marriage. Furthermore, 
state actors are prohibited, insofar as it is part of their official responsibility, 
to fail to provide a marriage license or otherwise officiate at same-sex wed-
dings. If this now means that a new separation of church and state must be 
accommodated to take account of religious actors who also officiate at mar-
riages on behalf of the state, so be it. What seems left open, of course, is 
what further protections state antidiscrimination statutes might provide out-
side of the same-sex marriage context. 
162 Goodstein, supra note 159. 
 163 Emma Green, How Will the U.S. Supreme Court’s Marriage Decision Affect Religious 
Liberty?, ATLANTIC (June 26, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/how-
will-the-us-supreme-courts-same-sex-marriage-decision-affect-religious-liberty/396986/ [http://perma.
cc/DP2T-JXVF]. 
164 Chief Justice Roberts made this point towards the end of his dissent in Obergefell, which 
the majority did not challenge. 135 S. Ct. at 2625–26 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 
  
 
